It is all connected. Mizrachi (merkaz rehani) was founded in 1902 in Vilnius, Lithuania, as a religious faction in the World Zionist Organization. In Palestine, the movement spearheaded the establishment of a Rabbinate under Rabbi Abraham Issac Kook. In 1952, after dissolving its relationship with the non-Zionist Orthodox parties, Mizrachi and Ha-Po'el ha-Mizrachi created the National Religious Party and a daily newspaper, Hazofeh. Ha-Kibbutz ha-Dati is Mizrachi's kibbutz movement. Mekor Rishon subsumed the newspaper, and the NRP went defunct in 2003. Followers of Religious Zionism are known as Dati Leumi, though many have turned haredi-leumi or Hardal.
Religious Zionism is a stream of Orthodoxy
with a pronounced political ideology. How is it connected to Modern Orthodoxy
in the Diaspora? That is one of the questions I was thinking about as I read journalist
Yair
Ettinger's Frayed: The Disputes Unraveling Religious Zionists (278 pages, Toby Press, $29.95). Ettinger, a kipa-sruga wearer, has perceptively covered the religion
beat in Israel for Haaretz and Kan (Israel Broadcasting
Authority), so he is well-positioned to launch readers into exploring the
various shades of Religious Zionism.
Religious Zionism is rooted in a triad: the
Land of Israel, the People of Israel, and the Torah of Israel, as Ettinger
explains. For literate Jews, regardless of religiosity and ideology, the
Covenant that anchors Jewish civilization is the connection between the land
and the people as described in the Torah – Ettinger's triad. Whether you take
this literally as Religious Zionists do or as a sacred foundational myth,
Jewish civilization is rooted in the land. The attachment to the land manifested
by other ancient civilizations, such as the American Indian tribes, the
Aboriginals of Australia, Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians, Assyrians, and the
South American Incas, is also an attribute of our civilization.
All that Theodor Herzl and his modern political
Zionism did was revive this element of our civilization. A short while later,
the teachings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook gave Orthodox Judaism its
roadmap into political Zionism. After 1967, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook provided Gush
Emunim's settlement movement with its messianic marching orders, and its energy
consumed religious Zionism.
Ettinger's book identifies disputes that
divide Israel's Dati Leumi world. These no longer involve settlements over the Green Line. Gush Emunim's triumph resolved the issue, making settling Judea, Samaria, and Gaza the First Imperative.
Nowadays, to my knowledge, no national religious figure who can draw a crowd opposes
the primacy of the settlement enterprise.
What's left to unravel? Plenty. For
instance, the role of women in the synagogue and the IDF, the reception of male
homosexuals in the synagogue, and whether to shake off the influence of the patronage-laden
state-funded Rabbinate (which today has only a thin Zionist veneer), including over marriage
and kashrut. Should Religious Zionists commit to building the Third Temple? 75%
of them support Temple Mount pilgrimages, though the Kooks (father and son) were opposed. And how should Religious Zionists relate to the non-Jewish world?
Take the issue of women in the IDF. Rabbis Zvi
Yehuda Kook and Shlomo Goren were not thrilled with the idea, Ettinger tells
us. Yet Zionist Religious girls did go into the army in numbers. Today's Hardal position,
as enunciated by Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, is uncompromising. "A girl who
enlists in the IDF claiming that she wants to contribute is indeed contributing
– she is contributing to the destruction of the state." Other rabbis add
that women who go into the army are potentially compromising their "modesty"
and are likely to emerge "damaged." The rabbis also do not want their
boys distracted and, therefore, oppose gender integration in combat units. Only
the Religious Kibbutz movement representing the non-Hardal remains of the
Mizrachi stream takes pride in sending its girls to the army, according to
Ettinger. My impression is that only a minority of national religious women now
do IDF service. Some girls do other forms of national service, but since the
goal is to maintain "modesty," the alternatives can be pretty parve.
In a parallel universe, a minority camp
within Religious Zionism is pushing the envelope on egalitarianism for women. Some
have pressed for partnership minyans, which give women a role in conducting the
services. Should women give homilies during davening from the women's
side of the partition dividing all Orthodox synagogues? Should they serve in
top synagogical leadership roles? Since many women are Torah scholars, and some
qualify as Yoetzet Halacha (essentially unordained rabbis), what weight
should their legal rulings have?
Women can push the envelope only so far,
partly for cultural and aesthetic reasons but primarily because of Halacha and
the stare decisis approach male Orthodox rabbis take toward interpreting
Jewish religious law.
Going back to politics. The ill-fated 1993
Oslo Accords with the PLO and Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza solidified
the Hardal political ascendency within Religious Zionism. Hardal is
ultra-Orthodox in religion and hyper-nationalist in politics. Under its
influence, young men are sporting knee-length tzitzit, extra large skullcaps,
and payot. Women are dressing more and more in the hyper-modest ultra-Orthodox
fashion, albeit with color. Those who identify as Hardal would also lean
conservative regarding women's participation in the synagogue. Further, Hardal
folks desire to rebuild the Temple on Mount Moriah where the Dome of the Rock
now stands, disregarding the prospect of an apocalyptic confrontation with the
Muslim world, which also considers the site holy. Ettinger offers a rosier scenario
in the "exceptionalism" of Yehuda Glick, who thinks rebuilding the
Temple while leaving the present Al-Aksa Mosque in place would be possible and pave
the way for a "religious utopia."
The role of the clergy is another point of
contention within the Religious Zionist stream. In the non-Zionist Haredi world,
which is ultra-Orthodox and insular from non-Jewish society, grand rabbis are held
to be oracles, and their guidance is sought on matters ranging from medical
procedures to voting in elections. Hardal Religious Zionists also relate to their
clerics as sainted. When Naftali Bennett challenged this attitude, Ettinger writes, things did not end well for him.
Ettinger chooses not to use the term Hardal
in his book. He does refer to today's leading Hardal politicians, Itamar
Ben-Gvir, head of the Kahane-lite Otzma Yehudit Party, and Bezalel Smotrich,
the National Union/Tkuma Party leader. Before the most recent elections held in
November 2022, Likud Party chief and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was
adamant that Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and Avi Maoz of the Noam Party run under a
single rubric to unite the entire Hardal and dati leumi camp. It worked. The bloc won 14
Knesset seats, briefly becoming the third-largest faction. Once sworn in,
Ben-Gvir and Maoz broke away from Smotrich (though they have no fundamental
differences) and returned to their respective parties. At the same time, Smotrich
rebranded his as the National Religious Party.
About 22 percent of Israelis identify as
Religious Zionists of all hues, according to
Ettinger. He says he can't predict whether a politically and
theologically moderate NRP/Mafdal-like religious Zionist party will rise again.
Its agenda was heavily weighed on education and social issues. As far as I
know, today, national religious Israelis who are not Hardal must seek political
expression through one of the non-parochial parties such as Benny Ganz's National
Unity. There are not enough of them to form their own religious party. The last
attempt was made in 1988 by rabbis Yehuda Amital and Michael Melchior.
Ettinger writes that the Mizrachi Party
dominated dati leumi politics back in the day. The NRP was the dominant
political institution alongside just a few religious-cultural gatekeepers, such
as Mercaz Harav. His thesis is that today, there are no gatekeepers or controlling
agenda-setters. Along with the ascendency of the settlement movement and political
Hardalism, many contending yeshivot, rabbis, and powerbrokers have emerged. So,
Religious Zionists can revel in not having a magisterium and in decentralized
decision-making. Ettinger terms this state of play "privatization."
Non-Hardal Religious Zionists mostly follow their consciences. Those in the
Hardal camp are pressed to "listen to their rabbis." Lots of
different rabbis.
Especially since October 7, 2023, the
already complicated attitude of Religious Zionists toward non-Zionist Haredim who
refuse to do any form of national service or send their sons to the army has
only become more fraught. The two share an Orthodox theology; their prayer
services are practically interchangeable. Yet, Religious Zionists have made
disproportionate sacrifices for Israeli security. Meantime, haredi youth are
now on their pre-Passover recess, fumfing around as if the country had
not just buried over 600 soldiers. The Haredi alibi of insularity is wearing a
wee thin.
Yet the dominant Hardal wing of Religious
Zionism is well-disposed toward Haredi society. They share an aesthetic for
close-mindedness. To the chagrin of haredi rabbis – twitchy haredi adolescents
or shababnikim feel drawn to Ben-Gvir's religious chauvinism tinged with
political extremism. If I am right that for some of their constituents, Haredi draft-dodging
is becoming intolerable, Ben Gvir and Smotsrich will have to "do a
Netanyahu" to maintain the alliance. They will need to obfuscate the haredi
refusal to serve or, at the very least, kick the issue down the road. The best
way to change the subject would be to channel the wrath of their electorate at
the "leftists" who have, undeniably, been calling for ending the October
7 War at any price.
How does all this look from 6,000 miles
away? A difference between Diaspora Modern Orthodoxy and Israeli Religious
Zionism is the latter's ongoing commitment to the Land and IDF service
(including nowadays relentless stints of reserve duty). At the same time,
non-Hardal Religious Zionists and Modern Orthodox Diaspora Jews may be drawing inspiration
from one another on the role of women and other social issues. Non-Hardal
Religious Zionists are finding workarounds to the Haredi-dominated Rabbinate when
they want to marry. Against the wishes of Hardal clerics like Dov Lior and Zvi
Thau, they are turning to national religious Tzohar rabbis who are of a
tolerant bent. They are also looking to bypass the Rabbinate on conversion and
kashrut. America's Modern Orthodox manage to marry and eat kosher without a tax-payer-funded
Rabbinate, so why shouldn't dati leumi Israelis enjoy the same privilege?
The two communities are not identical. A
difference between the Diaspora and Israel is that Religious Zionists are more
willing to think independently about the place of religion in society. They are
keen to explore artistic, literary, and cultural expression and to stake out
religious boundaries. Whereas in the Diaspora, centrist-leaning Modern Orthodox
feel constrained to live within normative parameters, or so say academic
observers such as sociologist Shlomo Fischer, who is cited in Yehuda Mirsky's
introduction to the Ettinger book.
I confess to finding the nomenclature of
Modern Orthodoxy misleading. The "modern" in Modern Orthodoxy should
not connote leading anything less than a Halachic lifestyle. One of the
characteristics of Orthodoxy is perforce insularity from the non-Jewish world –
in terms of food, culture, friendships, and other non-utilitarian relations.
Each sub-group within Orthodoxy finds its place along the insularity continuum
from fully acculturated to completely inward-looking.
Whatever their intramural differences,
Religious Zionists of all stripes and Modern Orthodox in the Diaspora appear united
in opposing concessions to non-Orthodox streams of Judaism, including at the
Western Wall Plaza, according to Ettinger.
I sense that Ettinger is not downhearted
about any unraveling within religious Zionism, seeing the disputes as a sign of
vibrancy. He assesses liberal Religious Zionism as alive and well, perhaps
because he identifies with this more moderate wing. Maybe there is a dichotomy
in Religious Zionism: politically monochromatic while synagogically kaleidoscopic.
Based on years of field reporting,
Ettinger's strength in this book is his mastery of the subject. With Shmuel
Rosner and, more lately, Yair Cherki, Ettinger helps render the multifaceted
Orthodox world to Israel's non-Orthodox majority. Here, I feel he shies away
from taking positions that could lead him into controversial territory, except
when he blames Bennett for fragmenting Religious Zionism's Big Tent. Yet by the
time Bennett reinvented himself to appeal beyond the Religious Zionist world and,
in May 2021, as head of the Yamina Party, joined a unity government with Yair
Lapid, the bulk of Religious Zionists were already in the Hardal Camp. Benett
was simply giving the camp's non-Hardal remnant a soft landing.
Frayed: The Disputes Unraveling
Religious Zionists has been expertly translated by
Eylon Levy and Mitch Ginsburg, making it a smooth and accessible read. There
are not a lot of sparks here, and no new analytical ground is unearthed, but
this is a solid primer on the struggles and place of Religious Zionism in
Israel.
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