Peace Now was created to give the impression
that Israel's first non-Labor prime minister
didn't have the nation behind him
This Friday marks the 15th anniversary of the death of Menachem Begin. He died of a broken heart on March 9, 1992, vilified as a warmonger by the Left and cast off by right-wing purists after he traded the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. The purists also berated Begin for his 1978 Camp David offer of five years of limited self-government to the Palestinian Arabs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, to be followed by final-status negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team - a proposal the Arabs rejected.
Begin would have been my hero even if he had never become prime minister, never ordered the destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor, in June 1981, and never negotiated Israel's first peace treaty with an Arab neighbor.
I admired him for commanding the Irgun during the revolt against the British; and for navigating a course midway between the moderation of the Hagana and the militancy of the Stern group. Perhaps most of all, I respected his reaction to David Ben-Gurion's unforgivable order that the Hagana attack the Irgun arms-ship Altalena: Begin prevented the tragedy from deteriorating into a Jewish civil war.
After 1948, with the system stacked against him, Begin became leader of the loyal opposition. A principled ideologue and fiery orator, he campaigned forcefully in 1952 against Israeli acceptance of financial reparations from Germany - and lost. He had every reason to challenge the legitimacy of a political system in which the allocation of virtually all resources was monopolized by Mapai, but he didn't.
Granted, Begin was no saint. He didn't encourage opposition to his leadership inside Herut. But he was an honest politician, lived modestly and preserved the philosophy of Ze'ev Jabotinsky.
MOST OF THE world had never heard of Menachem Begin until May 1977, when he was elected as Israel's first non-Labor premier. But from that day until he resigned in September 1983, his spirit broken by IDF losses in the war in Lebanon and the 1982 death of his wife and life-long companion Aliza - and ultimately, I would argue, by an unparalleled five-year campaign spearheaded by Peace Now and its allies abroad to force his government to embrace dangerously accommodationist policies toward the Arabs - Begin wasn't given a moment's respite.
Never before had an Israeli premier been so beleaguered, so vilified, so undermined by an alliance of left-wing domestic opponents, the Jewish Diaspora establishment, an implacable White House led by Jimmy Carter and a spiteful international media.
His foes found him "too Jewish," and his idea of trading "peace for peace" a non-starter. Thomas L. Friedman, who reported for The New York Times, first from Beirut and then from Jerusalem during the Begin years, later thus encapsulated the left-wing attitude toward Begin: "What made Begin… dangerous was that his fantasies about power were combined with a self-perception of being a victim… Begin always reminded me of Bernhard Goetz, the white Manhattanite who shot four black youths he thought were about to mug him on the New York subway… [Begin] was Bernhard Goetz with an F-15."
Even mortal threats to Israel had to be belittled because the Left was determined that Israel withdraw from Judea, Samaria and Gaza, captured 10 years earlier in the Six Day War. Failure to do so, leftists convinced themselves, would obliterate the possibility of a rapprochement with the Arabs. No matter how blood-curdling Arab deeds were, the Left discerned intimations of Palestinian moderation which needed to be encouraged by substantive Israeli concessions.
For Begin, this was anathema. First off, he believed Jewish claims to the West Bank and Gaza were rock-solid - far superior to those of Palestinian Arab nationalists. To a media that wouldn't give him the time of day he sought to make the legal, historical and strategic case for calling the territories Jewish. And, anyway, he didn't think sacrificing the West Bank and Gaza would bring peace; he was convinced that the Arabs had not accepted the idea of a sovereign Jewish state anywhere in the land.
WHAT REALLY unified and outraged his opponents - at home and abroad - was Begin's heart-felt embrace of the settlement enterprise. By the time he took office, some 24 communities had been established under Labor governments, according to Lords of the Land by Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar (though Gershom Gorenberg, in The Accidental Empire, claims there were nearly 80). Whatever the specifics, the first settlements included Kfar Etzion, Alon Shvut, Ma'aleh Adumim, Kiryat Arba, Elazar and Ofra. In fact, the first yishuv to be re-established after the Six Day War was in Gush Etzion, just south of Jerusalem, in September 1967.
For strategic reasons, as well as to solidify Israel's claim to the capital, Labor governments were eager to build in and around metropolitan Jerusalem and over the Green Line. But Labor only reluctantly allowed Gush Emunim's Orthodox settlers, who were inspired by a combination of theology, messianic zeal and nationalism, to build "non-strategic" settlements.
On May 19, 1977, just after his election, Begin (accompanied by Ariel Sharon) drove to Elon Moreh (Kaddum) outside Nablus. Here is the scene as described by Gorenberg:
"Begin, with a ring of thin black hair and heavy glasses that magnified his eyes, looked exhausted. His two bodyguards could not hold off the crowd. People kissed him, embraced him. Yeshiva students danced around him. After a brief tour, he stood in the square between the mobile homes and took the velvet-covered scroll in one arm, putting the other around Ariel Sharon's shoulder. Four men took the corners of [the] prayer shawl and held it over his head; a band prepared to play.
"Before the ceremony, Begin made a statement to the crowd. 'Soon,' he said, 'there will be many more Elon Morehs.'"
Begin was not going to "tolerate" settlements; he was going to make building them government policy. And this the US administration could not tolerate because it went against bedrock US policy: Israel would trade land for peace, and if there was no West Bank to trade - somewhere down the line when the Arabs would presumably be willing to take it - there would be no possibility of peace.
Nor would the Israeli Left tolerate settling the biblical Jewish heartland. It had a very different vision of Israel - a Western-oriented consumer society on the Mediterranean; the fewer Arabs, the better; the less traditional, the more cosmopolitan, the better.
For the Left it was inconceivable - simply beyond belief - that the Arab-Israel struggle would go on ad infinitum. As humanists, they couldn't abide the notion of an Israel ruling over hostile Arabs or settling land claimed by them. And, anyway, how were all these settlements going to be paid for, and at whose expense?
WHAT FOLLOWED was a scenario of political manipulation aimed at forcing Begin to change his policies or, better yet, returning the government to Labor. It was to be a multi-pronged effort: The White House would signal that the US-Israel relationship was jeopardized by Begin's election. The American Jewish leadership would radically "disassociate" its support for Israel from Begin's West Bank policies. And inside Israel, a campaign of street demonstrations and newspaper ads would create the impression that Begin's ideas were outside the mainstream.
The foreign press portrayed Begin as a former terrorist. Time magazine helpfully instructed its readers to pronounce Begin's name by rhyming it with the Dickens character Fagin. Newsweek labeled Begin a zealot and a fundamentalist.
Carter's White House immediately issued a "Notice to the Press" to set the "historical record" straight. Based on what we now know about Carter, his initial response to Begin's election is telling. You have to remember that in 1977 the Palestinian leadership wasn't even pretending to compromise. The possibility of cutting a West Bank deal with Jordan was still out there. No one was pushing a Palestinian state, and only the Arabs and the extreme Left embraced the "right of return."
But the White House engaged in a psychological campaign against Begin. If he had the hutzpa to claim that the West Bank was disputed, the White House would remind the world that Israel itself was disputed. And so it recalled: "UN General Assembly Resolution 181… [which] provided for the recognition of a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine, and UN GA Resolution 194… [which] endorsed the [Palestinian Arab] right to return to their homes or choose compensation for lost property…"
I'll leave a fuller description of the appalling treatment Begin received at the hands of Carter, the prestige media, and much of the American Jewish leadership for another time. Suffice it to say that the president routinely pressured US Jewish leaders (who anyway were hankering for the good old Labor days) to lobby Begin to change his West Bank policies. The insinuation was that if all they did was echo the Likud platform, the community might be open to regrettable charges of dual loyalty.
IT TOOK about two months, but in July 1977 the shock of Begin's victory galvanized a group of IDF reservists, many of whose leaders happened to be associated with Jerusalem's Van Leer Foundation, to issue an open letter to the new prime minister calling on him to pull Israel back to - what amounted to - the 1949 Armistice Lines.
No thanks to Jimmy Carter, just six months after Begin came to power, in November 1977, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat accepted Begin's invitation to address the Knesset.
Peace Now took the Sadat visit as a call to arms. By January 1978, the group was pressing Begin for a more conciliatory Israeli negotiating approach.
On March 11, 1978, Fatah terrorists infiltrating by sea from Lebanon carried out what became known as the coastal road massacre. They murdered 35 Israelis and wounded another 100. Begin ordered Operation Litani to go after PLO strongholds in Fatah-controlled southern Lebanon.
None of this weakened Peace Now's resolve. By April 1, 1978, it was able to muster a rally of some 20,000 supporters in Tel Aviv. From then on, demonstrations - outside his office, home, and along the highway to the airport - would be coordinated every time Begin went to Washington to see Carter.
Peace Now took an increasingly confrontational approach to the settlement enterprise. Activists blocked roads to communities; one group marched on the Jewish enclave in Hebron. Yuval Neriya, one of Peace Now's founders, explained: "Our idea was to show the prime minister that he did not have the nation behind him when he refused to negotiate [with Sadat and Carter] over Judea and Samaria to get peace."
Tzali Reshef, another movement founder, reiterated that Peace Now opposed retention of the West Bank and Gaza; opposed the confiscation of West Bank land (whether private or not); and opposed "on moral grounds"… "colonization [which] would lead to apartheid."
Israel's resources, Reshef argued, should be invested inside the Green Line, not on settlements.
Meanwhile, in the Diaspora, in April 1978, Peace Now had captured the imagination of 37 famous American Jews, who signed a letter supporting the Israeli activists. They wanted the world to know that they too opposed a Jewish presence in the West Bank and Gaza, and urged Begin to show greater "flexibility" in negotiating with Sadat. The New York Times was instrumental in playing up the letter, putting the story on page one.
Signatories included the No. 2 man in the Reform movement, Albert Vorspan (No. 1 was Rabbi Alexander Schindler, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations); political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset; Ira Silverman of the American Jewish Committee; Saul Bellow, the Nobel Prize laureate; literary editor Leon Wieseltier; Rabbi Joachim Prinz, a former chair of the Presidents Conference; and professor Leonard Fein of Brandeis.
A LENGTHY and difficult negotiating process - complicated by Palestinian intransigence - between Cairo, Jerusalem and Washington finally culminated in the March 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty.
The signing of the treaty took some of the steam out of Peace Now, though it did manage a few big rallies. Behind the scenes, however, it was very much in operation. For instance, by 1981 activists Yuli Tamir and David Zucker broke new ground by meeting with Yasser Arafat's liaison to the Israeli peace camp, Issam Sartawi, in Austria.
But Peace Now didn't really take off again - and become the powerhouse it is today, openly funded by a host of foundations and foreign governments - until the outbreak of the June 1982 Lebanon War.
Operation Peace for Galilee, as that war was first called, was not a war of necessity, whatever its arguable merits. Janet Aviad, who had been a Peace Now leader, told me:
"There was an atmosphere in Israel that one does not dissent, especially during a war. We had to break those taboos, and it was our responsibility to do it. It was a very hard decision. Peace Now didn't go out during the first days of the war. It took three weeks to get people to realize that there was no choice."
The Left thus broke the taboo against holding anti-government rallies during wartime.
The media embraced the Peace Now complaint against Begin full-throttle. Leading the pack was The New York Times, which reported growing "dissent" within the US Jewish community. Meanwhile, its magazine fomented the "dissent" with, for instance, a cover story by Amos Oz entitled "Has Israel Altered its Vision?"
Nevertheless, the government managed to hold firm against extraordinary pressures until it expelled Arafat from Lebanon in September 1982.
AND THEN all hell broke loose. Israel's ally, the Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated on September 14, 1982, in a massive explosion at his Beirut headquarters. In bloody retribution, on September 16-17, his Christian Arab militia massacred many hundreds of Palestinian Arabs in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla.
No Israeli soldiers were involved, nor were any even aware of what was going on. Peace Now, however, argued that the slaughter could not have happened absent IDF "sponsorship" - after all, Israel was in military control of the area.
Of course, this begged the question of why Israeli "military control" hadn't saved Gemayel from assassination in the first place.
But it was Peace Now's big moment. It organized a gigantic Saturday-night rally on September 25, 1982, in Tel Aviv, which drew over 250,000 anguished Israelis. Begin's Lebanon policies were in shambles.
Peace Now harassed Begin without letup. Protesters stood outside his windows with signs calling him a killer; others hoisted the tally of IDF soldiers killed in action. Then, on February 11, 1983, as Peace Now was holding yet another march through a hostile Jerusalem heading for the government compound near the Knesset, where Begin's dispirited cabinet was meeting to agonize over the Kahan Commission report, tragedy struck again.
As the rally was breaking up, a troubled man, a right-winger named Yona Avrushmi, lobbed a grenade; it killed 33-year-old Emil Grunzweig, a Van Leer Foundation staffer.
In denouncing the killing, Begin was grief-stricken: "God forbid that we should go the way of heinous violence," he mourned. "God forbid."Begin would hold on just seven months longer.
LOOKING BACK all these years later, neither Begin nor Peace Now got the Israel they wanted. In the very year Emil Grunzweig was killed, and despite all of Peace Now's marches, all the newspaper ads and all the foreign support, construction began on the northern Jerusalem neighborhood of Pisgat Ze'ev - over the Green Line. Renovation of the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem's Old City was also completed.
Peace Now was never able to mainstream its contention that Israelis could live securely within the - more or less - 1949 armistice lines, or that the Palestinians had genuinely accepted the idea of Jewish sovereignty within a truncated Israel.
Begin, for his part, was never able to sell Israelis - especially the non-Orthodox majority - on the idea that the settlement enterprise was a practical answer to Israel's West Bank dilemma.
We'll never know how things would have played out had Begin's strategy of marginalizing the PLO's intransigent external leadership not been undermined.
What if Begin's idea for genuine Palestinian autonomy, tantamount to nation-building, had been widely embraced by Israel's Left and the international community? What if autonomy had been nurtured by the resources the US and EU subsequently channeled into the Palestinian Authority? Wouldn't West Bankers and Gazans have been better off? With a political infrastructure and a history of competent self-government, wouldn't Palestinian demands for statehood today be more viable?
Begin was never given a chance, so we'll never know.
Thursday, March 08, 2007
Breaking Begin
I am an Israel briefer and analyst, a political scientist, and a speaker on Jewish civilization. I'm also a rewrite guy & fact-checker, who can make your writing clear and compelling & help you contextualize.
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
Bear knuckles - Russia, Israel & the Mideast
Why would Russia take part in a clash of civilizations when it can both sell nuclear technology to Iran and open a cultural center in TA?
Strange things are happening in Russia. Take a recent BBC report: The Russian military is investigating claims by a certain Pvt. Andrei Sychev that when he refused orders to work as a male prostitute in St. Petersburg, fellow soldiers hazing the new recruit so brutalized him that he developed gangrene in his legs and genitals, requiring amputation.
And pity the reporter who broke that story; since Vladimir Putin was formally elected as president in 2000, 13 journalists have been murdered - the latest, Anna Politkovskaya, gunned down in the lobby of her Moscow apartment building last year.
I used to be an avid Soviet watcher, but with the empire's collapse in December 1991 and the vanishing of the Soviet Jewry issue, I frankly lost interest. Absent the winner-take-all rivalry between liberty and tyranny, the travails of a buckled Russia didn't much interest me.
But what belatedly captured my attention, beyond the poor soldier with the gangrened private parts, was Putin's in-your-face February 10 speech at the Munich Security Conference before senior US and European leaders. Time magazine called it "a striking impersonation of Michael Corleone in The Godfather - the embodiment of implicit menace."
It was the tone as much as the substance that was so unnerving. Putin brazenly accused the US of making the world more dangerous than at any point since the Cold War: "We are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper-use of military force in international relations. One country, the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way."
America's unilateralist policies, he complained, were prompting "a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction."
Russia has been unhappy with the US for some time over its handling of Afghanistan, its inroads into former Soviet republics, and particularly the US invasion of Iraq.
Putin's generals are threatening to abrogate Cold War-era agreements banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles in retaliation for Washington's plans to deploy an anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, ostensibly to counter new threats from Iran.
SIXTEEN YEARS after the breakup of the Soviet Union Mother Russia is back, more powerful than at any time since the empire's demise.
Russia's foreign policy may be, as Winston Churchill's 1939 aphorism had it, a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
"But perhaps there is a key," Churchill continued: "That key is Russian national interest."
Start with the Slavic cultural mind-set: a heritage of imperialism, a habitual distrust for - yet envy of - the West, and a disposition toward authoritarianism. Geography also determines foreign policy; Russia has interests extending from Europe to Asia and onto the Middle East.
Moscow is not the "mischief-maker" it once was, Russia expert Marshall Goldman, professor emeritus at Harvard University, told me over the phone.
The Soviets used to facilitate terrorism and arm Israel's enemies. The good news, says Goldman, is that they're no longer promoting terrorism. The bad news is arms sales are brisk. The Russians recently delivered an anti-missile system to Iran worth $1.4 billion; last year Moscow sold Syria the Strelet anti-aircraft system. Russian-made (Syrian-supplied) Fagot and Kornet anti-tank missiles were reportedly used to devastating effect against the IDF by Hizbullah during the summer's Lebanon War.
Russia markets weapons to 61 countries. China and India are its biggest clients despite the not unreasonable expectation that they might be Moscow's rivals in future decades.
Putin's goal is to play the geopolitical game and keep Russia's arms industry humming. It keeps Russian workers employed and provides the necessary infrastructure for Putin's resurgent big-power ambitions.
MARK MEDISH, a top Russia-watcher at Washington's Carnegie Foundation, told me in an e-mail exchange that the old geo-strategic US-Soviet rivalry which once animated Russian behavior has lost its Cold-War intensity.
Gone are the client states and subversive activities. The ethos of Russian foreign policy today, says Medish, is "one of restored national pride, verging on over-assertiveness. Russia is still a relatively weak power and the Kremlin is traditionally good at playing the long strategic game with patience; the Russians know how to play black on the chessboard."
Israeli sources say Russia's main foreign policy goal is to keep the international community dependent on it. Moscow participates in every possible international forum - even holding observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. An application for observer status in the Arab League is pending.
Goldman, who has met both Putin and George W. Bush, says the two men genuinely seem to trust one another. Even as Putin denounces Washington, he refers to Bush as a man he can do business with, echoing Margaret Thatcher's "We can do business together," referring to Mikhail Gorbachev.
Personal chemistry can, of course, prove deceptive. Harry S Truman thought he had Stalin all figured out: "I got very well acquainted with Joe Stalin, and I like old Joe! He is a decent fellow. But Joe is a prisoner of the Politburo."
Yeah, right.
Whether personality matters or not, today's Putin is a very different man from the one who took power some seven years ago, says Harvard's Goldman. Then energy prices were low and Russia's power was at a nadir. The price of oil hovered below $20 a barrel. Today it's around $60.
Russia is now the biggest producer of petroleum and natural gas. Oil brings Russia wealth; gas gives it leverage over a Europe dependent on a pipeline controlled by Putin, says Goldman.
Granted the economy has only recently begun to diversify, and it remains dependent on oil and gas revenues, but Moscow now has the third-largest reserve of hard currency in the world (close to $301 billion at the end of 2006). Not bad when you consider that eight years ago the country was bankrupt.
FOR ISRAEL, what matters most is how Russia exercises its burgeoning influence in our part of the world, and in particular vis-a-vis Iran's quest for nuclear weapons.
It's the Russians who are building the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr; and they have plans to build six more similar facilities. Yet every expert I spoke with is convinced that Russia does not want to see a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Iran.
With all that, Moscow is prepared to allow negotiations with Teheran over its nuclear weapons program to drag on till the cows come home. That message also came through loud and clear in Herb Keinon's February 16 Post interview with Andrey Demidov, Russia's top diplomat in Tel Aviv.
But how can Russia facilitate Iran's nuclear program, stymie American-led efforts to impose sanctions against Teheran - and still be perceived as genuinely opposing a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic?
The answer demands a certain amount of Machiavellian thinking: The longer the crisis drags on, the greater is Russia's leverage.
Putin does want to stop Iran from building atom bombs. He recognizes the danger. That's one reason, Goldman says, why Putin wants Iranian nuclear waste transferred to Russia so it doesn't wind up getting recycled into weapons.
On Monday, the Russians announced that further work on the nearly completed Bushehr facility was being delayed, ostensibly because of a dispute over monthly payment arrangements.
To visiting Israelis, Putin intimates that he takes his commitment to Ariel Sharon to heart: Russia will not be the one to tip the strategic balance against Israel. At the same time, Putin is swayed by countervailing pressures to keep Russian factories in business, which is why Russia sold Iran nuclear technology in the first place.
So is Russia, inadvertently, selling Iran the rope by which it will one day hang Moscow, together with the rest of us? Medish, the Carnegie expert, doesn't buy it: "Let's be frank: It was the US ally Pakistan, whose rogue scientist AQ Khan sold Iran most of the 'rope' since the mid-1980s, even as [the US was] rightly lecturing Moscow about the dangers of the Iranian nuclear program."
Medish grants that "Russia has underestimated the risk, and was certainly careless with technology transfers until the mid-1990s, but far less so in the past decade."
He agrees with Goldman that the Kremlin would strongly prefer not to see a nuclear Iran. "But they do not fear it. Nuclear Pakistan looks far riskier from Moscow."
According to Medish, "The real question is how much leverage the Russians have with Teheran. The answer could be less than some experts suppose; certainly less than the Chinese have in the North Korean case."
WHATEVER ITS clout, let's just say Russia doesn't always use it to Israel's benefit. As a member of the Quartet (along with the UN, EU, and US) Moscow's behavior can be downright unhelpful.
Take its reaction to the February 8 Mecca agreement between Fatah and Hamas. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's spin was that the deal brought the Palestinians closer to meeting the Quartet's demands for recognition of Israel, renunciation of terrorism and acceptance of previous agreements - a very generous interpretation of what actually happened.
And chances are this will remain Moscow's line at the Quartet's scheduled meeting today in Berlin.
The Russians like the Mecca deal because they've all along opposed isolating Hamas, arguing that the Islamic Resistance Movement needs to be enticed toward becoming a purely political force.
This is why, on his visit to the region last week, Putin said he hoped sanctions against the Palestinian Authority would soon be lifted. He also pushed for a regional peace conference that would, presumably, include Damascus, an approach neither Washington nor Jerusalem is keen on. To be fair, Putin also urged the Palestinians to honor the PLO's past commitments and return kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Putin didn't come to Israel this time (he made an unprecedented visit to Jerusalem in April 2005), but he spoke with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert by telephone after the Mecca agreement was announced. When he left the region Putin sent an emissary to brief Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni on his talks.
ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS that Russia is a force in Middle East politics, being the only actor that can speak with all parties in the region including Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran. Not much can be accomplished if Russia is not on board; even as Moscow realizes that not much can be achieved absent Jerusalem's acquiescence.
The Russians say they feel a cultural affinity with Israel's large Russian-speaking population; and trade relations have never been better. There are daily El Al flights; Russian news bureaus maintain a presence in Jerusalem; a Russian consulate was recently opened in Haifa, and a cultural center is due to open in Tel Aviv.
The message from Moscow is that whoever Israel has a problem with, Russia has entree. Of course, the opposite is also true: Russia's interests with Iran, the Palestinian Authority, Hizbullah and Syria often conflict head-on with Israel's.
And when it comes to what is arguably the preeminent crisis of our time - the Islamist threat - Russia's attitude is thanks, but no thanks: What Moscow does not want is to participate in the clash of civilizations. This allows Putin to dissociate his own little etho-Islamist uprising in Chechnya - to pick just one example - from the larger "war on terror" being waged by Washington.
BACK HOME, meanwhile, don't expect Russia to develop into a Western-style democracy. Its political culture makes that near-impossible. Elections are due to take place in the Duma (parliament) in December 2007, and for the presidency in March 2008.
This will be an essentially cosmetic exercise. A seven percent electoral threshold, not to mention an inability to validate signatures to get their parties on the ballot, makes it difficult for Western-oriented reformist parties - an anyway fragmented bunch - to make much headway.
Putin, now only 54, is Russia's indisputable godfather. He may have aspirations to play a kind of Deng Xiaoping role, remaining a permanent behind-the-scenes authority even after formally leaving office. One rumor has him moving over to Gazprom, the state-controlled gas monopoly.
As the Carnegie's Mark Medish explains, "Power groups within the Kremlin are probably struggling to agree on an acceptable formula to allow Putin to retire, while putting in place a new leadership that is strong enough to maintain the current power-sharing arrangements."
Think of it, he says, as a sort of "guided democracy."
GOLDMAN characterizes the cadre that wields power - this nomenklatura - as comprising KGB-types who sit in the Kremlin making governmental decisions, and in state-controlled industries like Gazprom calling the economic shots.
In a book due out soon, Goldman terms this interlocking directorate an "oilogopoly." They've essentially re-nationalized all the industries that matter. And while the media is not state-owned, it is controlled by those who don't want to get on the oilogopoly's bad side. For instance, Gazprom runs a number of newspapers, including Izvestia.
Mind you, the oilogopoly doesn't mind people making a ruble. But it draws the line at allowing anyone to combine wealth, power and a desire to influence Russian politics, especially in a direction at odds with the course Putin has set. Mikhail Khodorkovsky can confirm that.
SO HOW should Israel relate to a resurgent Russia? The easy path would be to label Russia's political culture retrograde - think the brutalized Pvt. Andrei Sychev - its Middle East policies "anti-Israel" and Vladimir Putin himself an "anti-Semite." Such labeling would make some Israelis who don't want to acknowledge Russia's influence feel smug.
But creating a broiges by nursing our grievances would be counterproductive. Our disagreements - and this is where Time's Michael Corleone-Godfather allusion truly applies - are in the realm of business and politics. In other words, they are not "personal."
Putin is no anti-Semite. And what goes on inside Russia isn't our problem.
Pragmatically, Russia needs to be kept engaged with the West. For Israel, that means keeping ties on an even keel, even when Moscow's interests conflict with our own.
Whether on the Quartet, Hamas or Iran, realpolitik dictates that Jerusalem apply a variation of president Lyndon B. Johnson's first rule of Texas politics: It is better to have the Russians inside the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in.
Strange things are happening in Russia. Take a recent BBC report: The Russian military is investigating claims by a certain Pvt. Andrei Sychev that when he refused orders to work as a male prostitute in St. Petersburg, fellow soldiers hazing the new recruit so brutalized him that he developed gangrene in his legs and genitals, requiring amputation.
And pity the reporter who broke that story; since Vladimir Putin was formally elected as president in 2000, 13 journalists have been murdered - the latest, Anna Politkovskaya, gunned down in the lobby of her Moscow apartment building last year.
I used to be an avid Soviet watcher, but with the empire's collapse in December 1991 and the vanishing of the Soviet Jewry issue, I frankly lost interest. Absent the winner-take-all rivalry between liberty and tyranny, the travails of a buckled Russia didn't much interest me.
But what belatedly captured my attention, beyond the poor soldier with the gangrened private parts, was Putin's in-your-face February 10 speech at the Munich Security Conference before senior US and European leaders. Time magazine called it "a striking impersonation of Michael Corleone in The Godfather - the embodiment of implicit menace."
It was the tone as much as the substance that was so unnerving. Putin brazenly accused the US of making the world more dangerous than at any point since the Cold War: "We are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper-use of military force in international relations. One country, the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way."
America's unilateralist policies, he complained, were prompting "a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction."
Russia has been unhappy with the US for some time over its handling of Afghanistan, its inroads into former Soviet republics, and particularly the US invasion of Iraq.
Putin's generals are threatening to abrogate Cold War-era agreements banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles in retaliation for Washington's plans to deploy an anti-missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, ostensibly to counter new threats from Iran.
SIXTEEN YEARS after the breakup of the Soviet Union Mother Russia is back, more powerful than at any time since the empire's demise.
Russia's foreign policy may be, as Winston Churchill's 1939 aphorism had it, a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."
"But perhaps there is a key," Churchill continued: "That key is Russian national interest."
Start with the Slavic cultural mind-set: a heritage of imperialism, a habitual distrust for - yet envy of - the West, and a disposition toward authoritarianism. Geography also determines foreign policy; Russia has interests extending from Europe to Asia and onto the Middle East.
Moscow is not the "mischief-maker" it once was, Russia expert Marshall Goldman, professor emeritus at Harvard University, told me over the phone.
The Soviets used to facilitate terrorism and arm Israel's enemies. The good news, says Goldman, is that they're no longer promoting terrorism. The bad news is arms sales are brisk. The Russians recently delivered an anti-missile system to Iran worth $1.4 billion; last year Moscow sold Syria the Strelet anti-aircraft system. Russian-made (Syrian-supplied) Fagot and Kornet anti-tank missiles were reportedly used to devastating effect against the IDF by Hizbullah during the summer's Lebanon War.
Russia markets weapons to 61 countries. China and India are its biggest clients despite the not unreasonable expectation that they might be Moscow's rivals in future decades.
Putin's goal is to play the geopolitical game and keep Russia's arms industry humming. It keeps Russian workers employed and provides the necessary infrastructure for Putin's resurgent big-power ambitions.
MARK MEDISH, a top Russia-watcher at Washington's Carnegie Foundation, told me in an e-mail exchange that the old geo-strategic US-Soviet rivalry which once animated Russian behavior has lost its Cold-War intensity.
Gone are the client states and subversive activities. The ethos of Russian foreign policy today, says Medish, is "one of restored national pride, verging on over-assertiveness. Russia is still a relatively weak power and the Kremlin is traditionally good at playing the long strategic game with patience; the Russians know how to play black on the chessboard."
Israeli sources say Russia's main foreign policy goal is to keep the international community dependent on it. Moscow participates in every possible international forum - even holding observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. An application for observer status in the Arab League is pending.
Goldman, who has met both Putin and George W. Bush, says the two men genuinely seem to trust one another. Even as Putin denounces Washington, he refers to Bush as a man he can do business with, echoing Margaret Thatcher's "We can do business together," referring to Mikhail Gorbachev.
Personal chemistry can, of course, prove deceptive. Harry S Truman thought he had Stalin all figured out: "I got very well acquainted with Joe Stalin, and I like old Joe! He is a decent fellow. But Joe is a prisoner of the Politburo."
Yeah, right.
Whether personality matters or not, today's Putin is a very different man from the one who took power some seven years ago, says Harvard's Goldman. Then energy prices were low and Russia's power was at a nadir. The price of oil hovered below $20 a barrel. Today it's around $60.
Russia is now the biggest producer of petroleum and natural gas. Oil brings Russia wealth; gas gives it leverage over a Europe dependent on a pipeline controlled by Putin, says Goldman.
Granted the economy has only recently begun to diversify, and it remains dependent on oil and gas revenues, but Moscow now has the third-largest reserve of hard currency in the world (close to $301 billion at the end of 2006). Not bad when you consider that eight years ago the country was bankrupt.
FOR ISRAEL, what matters most is how Russia exercises its burgeoning influence in our part of the world, and in particular vis-a-vis Iran's quest for nuclear weapons.
It's the Russians who are building the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr; and they have plans to build six more similar facilities. Yet every expert I spoke with is convinced that Russia does not want to see a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Iran.
With all that, Moscow is prepared to allow negotiations with Teheran over its nuclear weapons program to drag on till the cows come home. That message also came through loud and clear in Herb Keinon's February 16 Post interview with Andrey Demidov, Russia's top diplomat in Tel Aviv.
But how can Russia facilitate Iran's nuclear program, stymie American-led efforts to impose sanctions against Teheran - and still be perceived as genuinely opposing a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic?
The answer demands a certain amount of Machiavellian thinking: The longer the crisis drags on, the greater is Russia's leverage.
Putin does want to stop Iran from building atom bombs. He recognizes the danger. That's one reason, Goldman says, why Putin wants Iranian nuclear waste transferred to Russia so it doesn't wind up getting recycled into weapons.
On Monday, the Russians announced that further work on the nearly completed Bushehr facility was being delayed, ostensibly because of a dispute over monthly payment arrangements.
To visiting Israelis, Putin intimates that he takes his commitment to Ariel Sharon to heart: Russia will not be the one to tip the strategic balance against Israel. At the same time, Putin is swayed by countervailing pressures to keep Russian factories in business, which is why Russia sold Iran nuclear technology in the first place.
So is Russia, inadvertently, selling Iran the rope by which it will one day hang Moscow, together with the rest of us? Medish, the Carnegie expert, doesn't buy it: "Let's be frank: It was the US ally Pakistan, whose rogue scientist AQ Khan sold Iran most of the 'rope' since the mid-1980s, even as [the US was] rightly lecturing Moscow about the dangers of the Iranian nuclear program."
Medish grants that "Russia has underestimated the risk, and was certainly careless with technology transfers until the mid-1990s, but far less so in the past decade."
He agrees with Goldman that the Kremlin would strongly prefer not to see a nuclear Iran. "But they do not fear it. Nuclear Pakistan looks far riskier from Moscow."
According to Medish, "The real question is how much leverage the Russians have with Teheran. The answer could be less than some experts suppose; certainly less than the Chinese have in the North Korean case."
WHATEVER ITS clout, let's just say Russia doesn't always use it to Israel's benefit. As a member of the Quartet (along with the UN, EU, and US) Moscow's behavior can be downright unhelpful.
Take its reaction to the February 8 Mecca agreement between Fatah and Hamas. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's spin was that the deal brought the Palestinians closer to meeting the Quartet's demands for recognition of Israel, renunciation of terrorism and acceptance of previous agreements - a very generous interpretation of what actually happened.
And chances are this will remain Moscow's line at the Quartet's scheduled meeting today in Berlin.
The Russians like the Mecca deal because they've all along opposed isolating Hamas, arguing that the Islamic Resistance Movement needs to be enticed toward becoming a purely political force.
This is why, on his visit to the region last week, Putin said he hoped sanctions against the Palestinian Authority would soon be lifted. He also pushed for a regional peace conference that would, presumably, include Damascus, an approach neither Washington nor Jerusalem is keen on. To be fair, Putin also urged the Palestinians to honor the PLO's past commitments and return kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Putin didn't come to Israel this time (he made an unprecedented visit to Jerusalem in April 2005), but he spoke with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert by telephone after the Mecca agreement was announced. When he left the region Putin sent an emissary to brief Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni on his talks.
ISRAEL UNDERSTANDS that Russia is a force in Middle East politics, being the only actor that can speak with all parties in the region including Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran. Not much can be accomplished if Russia is not on board; even as Moscow realizes that not much can be achieved absent Jerusalem's acquiescence.
The Russians say they feel a cultural affinity with Israel's large Russian-speaking population; and trade relations have never been better. There are daily El Al flights; Russian news bureaus maintain a presence in Jerusalem; a Russian consulate was recently opened in Haifa, and a cultural center is due to open in Tel Aviv.
The message from Moscow is that whoever Israel has a problem with, Russia has entree. Of course, the opposite is also true: Russia's interests with Iran, the Palestinian Authority, Hizbullah and Syria often conflict head-on with Israel's.
And when it comes to what is arguably the preeminent crisis of our time - the Islamist threat - Russia's attitude is thanks, but no thanks: What Moscow does not want is to participate in the clash of civilizations. This allows Putin to dissociate his own little etho-Islamist uprising in Chechnya - to pick just one example - from the larger "war on terror" being waged by Washington.
BACK HOME, meanwhile, don't expect Russia to develop into a Western-style democracy. Its political culture makes that near-impossible. Elections are due to take place in the Duma (parliament) in December 2007, and for the presidency in March 2008.
This will be an essentially cosmetic exercise. A seven percent electoral threshold, not to mention an inability to validate signatures to get their parties on the ballot, makes it difficult for Western-oriented reformist parties - an anyway fragmented bunch - to make much headway.
Putin, now only 54, is Russia's indisputable godfather. He may have aspirations to play a kind of Deng Xiaoping role, remaining a permanent behind-the-scenes authority even after formally leaving office. One rumor has him moving over to Gazprom, the state-controlled gas monopoly.
As the Carnegie's Mark Medish explains, "Power groups within the Kremlin are probably struggling to agree on an acceptable formula to allow Putin to retire, while putting in place a new leadership that is strong enough to maintain the current power-sharing arrangements."
Think of it, he says, as a sort of "guided democracy."
GOLDMAN characterizes the cadre that wields power - this nomenklatura - as comprising KGB-types who sit in the Kremlin making governmental decisions, and in state-controlled industries like Gazprom calling the economic shots.
In a book due out soon, Goldman terms this interlocking directorate an "oilogopoly." They've essentially re-nationalized all the industries that matter. And while the media is not state-owned, it is controlled by those who don't want to get on the oilogopoly's bad side. For instance, Gazprom runs a number of newspapers, including Izvestia.
Mind you, the oilogopoly doesn't mind people making a ruble. But it draws the line at allowing anyone to combine wealth, power and a desire to influence Russian politics, especially in a direction at odds with the course Putin has set. Mikhail Khodorkovsky can confirm that.
SO HOW should Israel relate to a resurgent Russia? The easy path would be to label Russia's political culture retrograde - think the brutalized Pvt. Andrei Sychev - its Middle East policies "anti-Israel" and Vladimir Putin himself an "anti-Semite." Such labeling would make some Israelis who don't want to acknowledge Russia's influence feel smug.
But creating a broiges by nursing our grievances would be counterproductive. Our disagreements - and this is where Time's Michael Corleone-Godfather allusion truly applies - are in the realm of business and politics. In other words, they are not "personal."
Putin is no anti-Semite. And what goes on inside Russia isn't our problem.
Pragmatically, Russia needs to be kept engaged with the West. For Israel, that means keeping ties on an even keel, even when Moscow's interests conflict with our own.
Whether on the Quartet, Hamas or Iran, realpolitik dictates that Jerusalem apply a variation of president Lyndon B. Johnson's first rule of Texas politics: It is better to have the Russians inside the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in.
I am an Israel briefer and analyst, a political scientist, and a speaker on Jewish civilization. I'm also a rewrite guy & fact-checker, who can make your writing clear and compelling & help you contextualize.
Wednesday, February 07, 2007
Absolute atheism
Godlessness is all the rage, but faith remains a virtue
To maintain its New York State accreditation, my Manhattan yeshiva high school offered us 10th-graders a semester or two of Greek and Roman mythology. The textbooks were kept in a locked room, with monitors distributing them for our lessons and collecting them afterwards.
Orthodoxy during the 1970s was moving toward greater insularity - not an unreasonable phenomenon given the debasement of popular culture then taking place.
Frankly, paganism was not a spiritual threat in our neck of the woods. What the rabbis feared from unfettered exposure to Greek and Roman mythology (other than our adolescent gawking at illustrations of comely female gods), was that unguided philosophical inquiry might weaken our absolute faith.
The slippery slope our Old World teachers feared was that we might become vaguely "less religious."
The prospect of outright godlessness - apikorsus - could not have weighed heavily on their minds. After all, the Bible warns obsessively about false gods and polytheism, but it is silent about atheism.
THESE DAYS, however, talk of atheism is all the rage, driven by Richard Dawkins's new book The God Delusion, an international best-seller ranking among the top 20 on both Amazon and The New York Times lists, and by Sam Harris's Letter to a Christian Nation.
In the US, ABC's Nightline program devoted a segment last week to atheist activists who proselytize believers, including teenagers, via the Web. One such posting read: "My name is Joel. I deny the Holy Spirit, as well as God, Jesus, Buddha, Zeus, Muhammad, Joseph Smith, Sponge Bob, the pope, Santa Clause [sic], Mother Mary, the Easter bunny, the tooth fairy, Optimus Prime, all the saints and Spiderman."
The National Catholic Register devoted part of an issue last month to "Answering the Attack: The Incoherence of Atheism"; while the blogosphere is agog with godless talk including debate over whether a person can be Jewish and atheist.
It used to be atheists kept a low profile. At Brooklyn College I took a couple of science classes in Ingersoll Hall, never realizing that its namesake, Robert G. Ingersoll, was a renowned atheist. Okay, the name Madalyn Murray O'Hair, "the atheist," would come up in the news, but she was the Christians' problem; and to us they were anyway on the wrong track.
I wonder if atheism has been propelled so high up the intellectual agenda as a consequence of the clash of civilizations. Militant Islam seems to know where it stands and what it wants. The pews of the Judeo-Christian world, in contrast, stand empty, with the ethos of Western society seemingly up for grabs.
The situation is made knottier by American social conservatives who are leading the campaign against the Islamist threat while simultaneously waging a cultural war over such issues as abortion and homosexuality.
Notwithstanding 9/11, those raised to be broadminded find it hard to acknowledge that the planet is being propelled into a sort of medieval time warp.
Meanwhile the detested war in Iraq has conflated all too many hot-button issues which are at the nexus of religion and politics, leading some to ponder whether "Bush's God" is really all that preferable to Osama bin Laden's.
This is the context in which Dawkins, an Oxford professor who's dedicated his life to promoting science among the masses, has elbowed his way onto the scene. The God Delusion is an unabashedly intolerant disputation against God and the religious.
THE BOOK offers the classically false either/or choices so favored by pundits, politicians, theologians and even scientists with an ax to grind. These alternatives are intended to paint the reader into a corner: Are you with God, or with the devil? With the Creator of Genesis or with Darwin? Do you believe in a supernatural micro-managing lord of the universe, or that everything in life is a throw of the dice? Do you embrace scriptural inerrancy - and with it divine dictation - or do you dismiss the Bible as middlebrow literature? Do you stand with promiscuous homosexuals, or the nuclear family? Do you favor killing babies in the womb, or a woman's right to control her own body?
It's the job of polemicists to frame the debate categorically, but the rest of us need not cede the field to those who abhor the possibility of a middle ground. Dawkins's straw man is absolutist religion - his antidote, absolutist atheism. He paints faith as inherently fundamentalist and those who embrace it as dangerously delusional.
Dawkins's reliance on secondary sources (he's a lapsed Anglican) leads him to mistakenly assume that Orthodox Jews are Bible-literalist - when in many ways they are far from it. Nevertheless, the more theologically conservative one is (Jewish, Christian or Muslim) the stronger Dawkins's rationalist challenge may seem.
His is an incendiary argument: Monotheism is in no way superior to polytheism. Belief in a supernatural God, or one who answers prayers, is delusional; but if you discount God's supernatural qualities you're playing fast and loose with the very definition of God. Agnostics are gutless for straddling the rational/delusional fence; and, as you might have guessed, Dawkins holds that religion doesn't deserve any more "respect" than witchcraft.
WHEN WE do good, behave altruistically or display empathy, writes Dawkins, such moral behavior is actually part of our evolutionary development; in contrast, blind adherence to the Bible's teachings often leads people to immorality - at least by the standards of contemporary humanism.
Among the many stupid or evil things preached, or done, in the name of God, Dawkins lists the kidnapping in 1858 of Edgardo Mortara in Italy after a "secret baptism." He decries both the fanaticism of the Church in not allowing a baptized child to be raised by his Jewish parents, and of Edgardo's parents for having employed a Christian nanny in the first place, out of their own misguided faith which necessitated the presence of a shabbos goy under their roof.
As for all the evil caused by atheists, writes Dawkins: "Individual atheists [like Hitler and Stalin] may do evil things, but they don't do evil things in the name of atheism [while] religious wars are really fought in the name of religion, and they have been horribly frequent in history."
Dawkins taunts readers who view religion in a favorable light: "Do those people who hold up the Bible as an inspiration to moral certitude have the slightest notion of what is actually written in it?" Have they read Deuteronomy 20, which advocates "genocide"; or Leviticus 20, which would get you stoned for gathering sticks on the Sabbath?
And he has no patience whatsoever for those who, as he sees it, pick and choose those parts of the Bible they take literally while either interpreting or dismissing as archaic those elements they're uncomfortable with.
THERE'S A lot in The God Delusion to grapple with. I'll leave it for Bible scholars and theologians to pick up the gauntlet.
But Dawkins is worth reading because he forces non-Orthodox traditionalists like me to distinguish between God and religion, to contemplate what we mean when we speak about God; to reflect on why we pray; to wrestle with Dawkins's critique of the moral conduct of even God, let alone that of Abraham, Moses and Joshua - which, let's face it, frequently leaves us baffled.
Yet his atheist alternative to faith leaves me cold. What matters is whether humanity can soar higher with God or with humanism. Even if we grant that Karl Marx had a point in arguing that "religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world... the opium of the people" - what solace do the atheists have to offer humanity in its place?
Dawkins retorts: "Religion's power to console doesn't make it true." If the demise of God leaves a yawning gap, so be it.
But, as I said, much depends on a willingness to buy into Dawkins's anthropomorphic conception of God. And for Jews, I venture to say, God is incomprehensible and cannot be defined.
Jewish civilization allows for a variety of avenues to God. He is present in the lives of hassidim as well as in the lives of Reconstructionist Jews. For the former, God is an almost tangible presence, for the latter, depersonalized and ephemeral. But as Rabbi Mordechai Kaplan wrote: To believe in God is to reckon with life's creative forces, to affirm that life has value. It is a hypothesis about reality that we call faith.
Personally, I'm with the post-rationalist approach of British rabbi Louis Jacobs who, back in the 1950s, rejected the either/or model of thinkers like Dawkins: "We refuse to accept that the only choice before us is the stark one of either rejecting all modern knowledge and scholarship or rejecting belief. We must believe that we can have both."
Or to paraphrase the Kotzker Rebbe: If I could understand God, I would be God. A god that Richard Dawkins can describe? Phooey - I don't need such a god.
To maintain its New York State accreditation, my Manhattan yeshiva high school offered us 10th-graders a semester or two of Greek and Roman mythology. The textbooks were kept in a locked room, with monitors distributing them for our lessons and collecting them afterwards.
Orthodoxy during the 1970s was moving toward greater insularity - not an unreasonable phenomenon given the debasement of popular culture then taking place.
Frankly, paganism was not a spiritual threat in our neck of the woods. What the rabbis feared from unfettered exposure to Greek and Roman mythology (other than our adolescent gawking at illustrations of comely female gods), was that unguided philosophical inquiry might weaken our absolute faith.
The slippery slope our Old World teachers feared was that we might become vaguely "less religious."
The prospect of outright godlessness - apikorsus - could not have weighed heavily on their minds. After all, the Bible warns obsessively about false gods and polytheism, but it is silent about atheism.
THESE DAYS, however, talk of atheism is all the rage, driven by Richard Dawkins's new book The God Delusion, an international best-seller ranking among the top 20 on both Amazon and The New York Times lists, and by Sam Harris's Letter to a Christian Nation.
In the US, ABC's Nightline program devoted a segment last week to atheist activists who proselytize believers, including teenagers, via the Web. One such posting read: "My name is Joel. I deny the Holy Spirit, as well as God, Jesus, Buddha, Zeus, Muhammad, Joseph Smith, Sponge Bob, the pope, Santa Clause [sic], Mother Mary, the Easter bunny, the tooth fairy, Optimus Prime, all the saints and Spiderman."
The National Catholic Register devoted part of an issue last month to "Answering the Attack: The Incoherence of Atheism"; while the blogosphere is agog with godless talk including debate over whether a person can be Jewish and atheist.
It used to be atheists kept a low profile. At Brooklyn College I took a couple of science classes in Ingersoll Hall, never realizing that its namesake, Robert G. Ingersoll, was a renowned atheist. Okay, the name Madalyn Murray O'Hair, "the atheist," would come up in the news, but she was the Christians' problem; and to us they were anyway on the wrong track.
I wonder if atheism has been propelled so high up the intellectual agenda as a consequence of the clash of civilizations. Militant Islam seems to know where it stands and what it wants. The pews of the Judeo-Christian world, in contrast, stand empty, with the ethos of Western society seemingly up for grabs.
The situation is made knottier by American social conservatives who are leading the campaign against the Islamist threat while simultaneously waging a cultural war over such issues as abortion and homosexuality.
Notwithstanding 9/11, those raised to be broadminded find it hard to acknowledge that the planet is being propelled into a sort of medieval time warp.
Meanwhile the detested war in Iraq has conflated all too many hot-button issues which are at the nexus of religion and politics, leading some to ponder whether "Bush's God" is really all that preferable to Osama bin Laden's.
This is the context in which Dawkins, an Oxford professor who's dedicated his life to promoting science among the masses, has elbowed his way onto the scene. The God Delusion is an unabashedly intolerant disputation against God and the religious.
THE BOOK offers the classically false either/or choices so favored by pundits, politicians, theologians and even scientists with an ax to grind. These alternatives are intended to paint the reader into a corner: Are you with God, or with the devil? With the Creator of Genesis or with Darwin? Do you believe in a supernatural micro-managing lord of the universe, or that everything in life is a throw of the dice? Do you embrace scriptural inerrancy - and with it divine dictation - or do you dismiss the Bible as middlebrow literature? Do you stand with promiscuous homosexuals, or the nuclear family? Do you favor killing babies in the womb, or a woman's right to control her own body?
It's the job of polemicists to frame the debate categorically, but the rest of us need not cede the field to those who abhor the possibility of a middle ground. Dawkins's straw man is absolutist religion - his antidote, absolutist atheism. He paints faith as inherently fundamentalist and those who embrace it as dangerously delusional.
Dawkins's reliance on secondary sources (he's a lapsed Anglican) leads him to mistakenly assume that Orthodox Jews are Bible-literalist - when in many ways they are far from it. Nevertheless, the more theologically conservative one is (Jewish, Christian or Muslim) the stronger Dawkins's rationalist challenge may seem.
His is an incendiary argument: Monotheism is in no way superior to polytheism. Belief in a supernatural God, or one who answers prayers, is delusional; but if you discount God's supernatural qualities you're playing fast and loose with the very definition of God. Agnostics are gutless for straddling the rational/delusional fence; and, as you might have guessed, Dawkins holds that religion doesn't deserve any more "respect" than witchcraft.
WHEN WE do good, behave altruistically or display empathy, writes Dawkins, such moral behavior is actually part of our evolutionary development; in contrast, blind adherence to the Bible's teachings often leads people to immorality - at least by the standards of contemporary humanism.
Among the many stupid or evil things preached, or done, in the name of God, Dawkins lists the kidnapping in 1858 of Edgardo Mortara in Italy after a "secret baptism." He decries both the fanaticism of the Church in not allowing a baptized child to be raised by his Jewish parents, and of Edgardo's parents for having employed a Christian nanny in the first place, out of their own misguided faith which necessitated the presence of a shabbos goy under their roof.
As for all the evil caused by atheists, writes Dawkins: "Individual atheists [like Hitler and Stalin] may do evil things, but they don't do evil things in the name of atheism [while] religious wars are really fought in the name of religion, and they have been horribly frequent in history."
Dawkins taunts readers who view religion in a favorable light: "Do those people who hold up the Bible as an inspiration to moral certitude have the slightest notion of what is actually written in it?" Have they read Deuteronomy 20, which advocates "genocide"; or Leviticus 20, which would get you stoned for gathering sticks on the Sabbath?
And he has no patience whatsoever for those who, as he sees it, pick and choose those parts of the Bible they take literally while either interpreting or dismissing as archaic those elements they're uncomfortable with.
THERE'S A lot in The God Delusion to grapple with. I'll leave it for Bible scholars and theologians to pick up the gauntlet.
But Dawkins is worth reading because he forces non-Orthodox traditionalists like me to distinguish between God and religion, to contemplate what we mean when we speak about God; to reflect on why we pray; to wrestle with Dawkins's critique of the moral conduct of even God, let alone that of Abraham, Moses and Joshua - which, let's face it, frequently leaves us baffled.
Yet his atheist alternative to faith leaves me cold. What matters is whether humanity can soar higher with God or with humanism. Even if we grant that Karl Marx had a point in arguing that "religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world... the opium of the people" - what solace do the atheists have to offer humanity in its place?
Dawkins retorts: "Religion's power to console doesn't make it true." If the demise of God leaves a yawning gap, so be it.
But, as I said, much depends on a willingness to buy into Dawkins's anthropomorphic conception of God. And for Jews, I venture to say, God is incomprehensible and cannot be defined.
Jewish civilization allows for a variety of avenues to God. He is present in the lives of hassidim as well as in the lives of Reconstructionist Jews. For the former, God is an almost tangible presence, for the latter, depersonalized and ephemeral. But as Rabbi Mordechai Kaplan wrote: To believe in God is to reckon with life's creative forces, to affirm that life has value. It is a hypothesis about reality that we call faith.
Personally, I'm with the post-rationalist approach of British rabbi Louis Jacobs who, back in the 1950s, rejected the either/or model of thinkers like Dawkins: "We refuse to accept that the only choice before us is the stark one of either rejecting all modern knowledge and scholarship or rejecting belief. We must believe that we can have both."
Or to paraphrase the Kotzker Rebbe: If I could understand God, I would be God. A god that Richard Dawkins can describe? Phooey - I don't need such a god.
I am an Israel briefer and analyst, a political scientist, and a speaker on Jewish civilization. I'm also a rewrite guy & fact-checker, who can make your writing clear and compelling & help you contextualize.
Wednesday, January 24, 2007
Boker tov, 'Economist'
Modern Jews have been examining
"what it means to be Jewish"
since the Enlightenment
Here's one version of reality: Once upon a time, "being a potential Israeli citizen" was the "anchor" for "what it means to be a Jew." But now, "as the threat of genocide or of Israel's destruction has receded, a growing number of diaspora Jews neither feel comfortable with always standing up for Israel, nor feel a need to invoke Israel in defining what makes them Jewish."
Big Jewish organizations "have not caught up" with this reality and often lobby not so much for Israel as its "right-wing political establishment."
This "tendency to stand by Israel right or wrong" especially over its policies in the "occupied territories" is hardly any incentive for keeping Diaspora youth from "leaving the faith." Indeed, while some youth find "defending Israel uncritically" "distasteful," "others simply find Israel irrelevant."
That's how last week's Economist (January 13-19) evaluated "The state of the Jews" in an editorial entitled "Diaspora blues."
In a further three-page inside feature, Economist editors concluded: "Jews around the world are gradually ceasing to regard Israel as a focal point. As a result, many are re-examining what it means to be Jewish."
I'LL COME back to how long Jews have been "re-examining what it means to be Jewish" later. Suffice it to say that the constant redefining of Jewishness is part and parcel of what modern Jewish life is about. But I'll grant that pro-Israelism as a touchstone of Jewish identity is on the wane. The pro-Israel phenomenon began only after the 1967 war, coincided with the freedom for Soviet Jewry movement, and is now dissipating.
If, however, Economist editors really think that millions of well-heeled Diaspora Jews once held visions of becoming "Israeli citizens," they are less sagacious than I imagined.
I've got more news for The Economist: Dissociating Diaspora Jews from Israel's policies in the "occupied territories" goes back almost to their 1967 capture. The Diaspora establishment never embraced the idea of Jewish sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. And the record shows that Jewish machers have never hesitated to criticize Israel - not even back when Golda Meir was premier.
Take Rabbi Joachim Prinz, who was chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations until just after the Six Day War. He championed a Jewish "declaration of political independence" from Israel. And as early as December 1967, left-wing critics were calling on Jerusalem to trade land - not for peace, but for free navigation through the Suez Canal.
Back in the late 1960s and early 1970s, heavy-hitters such as the World Jewish Congress's Nachum Goldmann and Philip Klutznick were habitually critical of Israeli policies. And by the time Menachem Begin became prime minister in 1977, up and down the Jewish mainstream toeing the Israeli line was the exception, not the rule.
As for non-establishment groups on the Jewish Left, they had been "re-defining" what it meant to be pro-Israel from at least the 1970s. For instance, Breira, founded in 1973, supported unconditional inclusion of the pre-Oslo PLO in the diplomatic process. Before Breira there was the Radical Zionist Alliance, and after Breira came the New Jewish Agenda.
So The Economist is wrong in promulgating the idea that to be a critic of Israel in the Diaspora is somehow avant garde.
THE NEWSPAPER - it doesn't like being called a magazine - is also mistaken in insinuating that threats to Israel have receded. Show me a kindergarten, bus line, cafe or mall that - embracing The Economist's sense of serenity - has removed its armed guards.
The Economist says that "the threat [to Israel] of genocide... has receded." Really. Does the name Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ring a bell? And the last time I checked, the best offer we were getting from Hamas was a 10-year truce, conditioned on a pullback to the 1949 armistice lines, and on opening our doors to millions of "refugees" (and their descendents) "returning" to our truncated state.
What about Fatah's more moderate Mahmoud Abbas? From where I sit, he and Hamas's Ismail Haniyeh seem to disagree more over means than ends (see, for instance, Abbas's January 11 speech in Ramallah).
YET WHILE its editorial is way off the mark, the inside feature, "Second thoughts about the Holy Land" provides an informative, albeit tendentious, summary of Israel-Diaspora relations.
The paper, not known for its Zionist sympathies, seems to revel in highlighting the chasms between the Diaspora and Israel. Nevertheless, it has pulled together all the right data, such as a study (several years old) showing that "only 57%" of American Jews say Israel is "very important" to their Jewish identity. It correctly points to the senseless cleavages created by our narrow-minded Orthodox establishment in their condescending attitude toward the world's pluralistic Jewish majority; it correctly notes that being Jewish is, for many young people in the West, only one part of their multifaceted identities; and it draws attention to the welcome revival - quite unconnected to the Zionist enterprise - of Jewish life in such places as Moscow, Berlin and LA.
It belatedly discovers that young people are finding new, non-Zionist ways of "doing Jewish" such as the fine tikkun olam work of The American Jewish World Service.
To its credit, while The Economist may delight in Israel's discomfiture, it reasonably acknowledges that a "fruitful fusion" between Zion and the Diaspora is the best hope for both.
BACK WHEN I was in college, I was assigned a book of essays edited in 1971 by James A. Sleeper and Alan L. Mintz and entitled The New Jews. So I was intrigued to see The Economist cite a recent work with a similar title in arguing its thesis. New Jews: The End of the Jewish Diaspora by Caryn Aviv and David Shneer rejects the very idea of a "diaspora" with Israel at the core. At first blush this sounds radical - even anti-Zionist. After all, what are we Jews absent the covenant idea of a shared past, a blueprint for the future, and Israel at the center?
That may be my ideal, but in practice modern Jews have been "redefining" what it means to be Jewish since the Enlightenment in the 1700s. If anything, the destruction of European Jewry between 1933 and 1945, the subsequent birth of Israel, and the growth of a heterogeneous, acculturated Diaspora in the West has only served to accelerate the debate over "Who is a Jew" and "what it means to be Jewish" into the 21st century.
In an exchange of e-mails, Caryn Aviv, a lecturer at the Center for Judaic Studies at the University of Denver, and David Shneer, director of the center, write that Israel radically changed the way Jews identify, both as individuals and as a collective. "The legacy of Zionism cannot be ignored in Jewish life today. But neither is Israel necessarily the center of all things Jewish today for all Jews." Israel, they say, is but one of a number of cultural centers reflecting the diversity of Jewish life.
How relevant is Israel to your own lives?
Israel is deeply relevant - as are other Jewish centers around the world. We both spend time each year in Israel. Aviv has lived in Jerusalem. And we each subscribe to the JTA Daily News Bulletin - though we wish it had more news about global Jewish communities and less about the "crisis in the Middle East."
You've suggested that maybe in 10 years' time there could be a sort of "birthright" to take Diaspora youth to Vilnius to study Yiddish, or Prague to study art...
Why not? These places might be just as effective and compelling to engage young Jews, the way birthright Israel has tried to cultivate a connection to Israel.
How do you assess 'The Economist's' contention that Jews around the world are ceasing to regard Israel as a focal point?
Our book argues along a similar line, although we'd say that Israel is becoming one of many centers on a global Jewish map. It is interesting to us that our somewhat radical rethinking of the global Jewish map that discards the concept of diaspora encourages people to think that we're anti-Zionist, which our responses hopefully suggest we're not.
We're also not in the mainstream, which still holds onto the notion that there are Israeli Jews and everyone else is a diaspora Jew, rather than seeing all Jews as global.
What of the dangers Israel faces?
Sure we see the dangers, but our book is about global Jewish life and the multiple ways Jews live it. Focusing on anxiety about existential threats that Israel faces often obscures other important issues within Israel, not to mention important stories about the resilience and vibrancy of Jewish life in lots of other places.
Anyway, your presumption is that championing Israel should come first. But the reality is that it's a balancing act - for some Israel is indeed a high priority, but for a larger group it's not. We don't see that as a problem.
You Israelis need to focus on finding long-term solutions to your problems, and US Jews who are invested in Israel can help. At the same time, we Jews would be smart and strategic to focus on nurturing and sustaining our own communities.
Does the relationship have to be either, or?
Absolutely not. Jews should, can, and do support thriving Jewish communities around the world, including in Israel. We argue that by imagining a global, rather than "diasporic" Jewish world, all Jews benefit. Philanthropy, people, and ideas should be flowing in many different directions.
You've posed the rhetorical question: What does a middle-class professional, secular Jew in LA have in common with a working-class Sephardi Orthodox Jew in Bnei Brak? And your answer is...
That by self-defining as Jews they opt into a common past and heritage (though each would also have her own) which can - but does not always - create an imagined bond between them.
Sure, in terms of practices, beliefs, cultures we find little in common between the two. And we think this condition (which isn't anything new) is okay; that Jews will survive and thrive even if those two imagined Jews have little in common.
PERSONALLY, I'm not sanguine, much less laudatory, about a Jewish world in which Israel is not the cultural, spiritual and political hub, and where two imagined Jews who each think of themselves as Jews have so little in common. But I see all this grappling with identity, alienation, faith and the Israel-Diaspora relationship as part of a continuing process that is "good for the Jews," keeping us from becoming stultified.
Where The Economist sees "Diaspora blues," I see an ancient and stiff-necked people struggling not just with God, but with itself.
"what it means to be Jewish"
since the Enlightenment
Here's one version of reality: Once upon a time, "being a potential Israeli citizen" was the "anchor" for "what it means to be a Jew." But now, "as the threat of genocide or of Israel's destruction has receded, a growing number of diaspora Jews neither feel comfortable with always standing up for Israel, nor feel a need to invoke Israel in defining what makes them Jewish."
Big Jewish organizations "have not caught up" with this reality and often lobby not so much for Israel as its "right-wing political establishment."
This "tendency to stand by Israel right or wrong" especially over its policies in the "occupied territories" is hardly any incentive for keeping Diaspora youth from "leaving the faith." Indeed, while some youth find "defending Israel uncritically" "distasteful," "others simply find Israel irrelevant."
That's how last week's Economist (January 13-19) evaluated "The state of the Jews" in an editorial entitled "Diaspora blues."
In a further three-page inside feature, Economist editors concluded: "Jews around the world are gradually ceasing to regard Israel as a focal point. As a result, many are re-examining what it means to be Jewish."
I'LL COME back to how long Jews have been "re-examining what it means to be Jewish" later. Suffice it to say that the constant redefining of Jewishness is part and parcel of what modern Jewish life is about. But I'll grant that pro-Israelism as a touchstone of Jewish identity is on the wane. The pro-Israel phenomenon began only after the 1967 war, coincided with the freedom for Soviet Jewry movement, and is now dissipating.
If, however, Economist editors really think that millions of well-heeled Diaspora Jews once held visions of becoming "Israeli citizens," they are less sagacious than I imagined.
I've got more news for The Economist: Dissociating Diaspora Jews from Israel's policies in the "occupied territories" goes back almost to their 1967 capture. The Diaspora establishment never embraced the idea of Jewish sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. And the record shows that Jewish machers have never hesitated to criticize Israel - not even back when Golda Meir was premier.
Take Rabbi Joachim Prinz, who was chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations until just after the Six Day War. He championed a Jewish "declaration of political independence" from Israel. And as early as December 1967, left-wing critics were calling on Jerusalem to trade land - not for peace, but for free navigation through the Suez Canal.
Back in the late 1960s and early 1970s, heavy-hitters such as the World Jewish Congress's Nachum Goldmann and Philip Klutznick were habitually critical of Israeli policies. And by the time Menachem Begin became prime minister in 1977, up and down the Jewish mainstream toeing the Israeli line was the exception, not the rule.
As for non-establishment groups on the Jewish Left, they had been "re-defining" what it meant to be pro-Israel from at least the 1970s. For instance, Breira, founded in 1973, supported unconditional inclusion of the pre-Oslo PLO in the diplomatic process. Before Breira there was the Radical Zionist Alliance, and after Breira came the New Jewish Agenda.
So The Economist is wrong in promulgating the idea that to be a critic of Israel in the Diaspora is somehow avant garde.
THE NEWSPAPER - it doesn't like being called a magazine - is also mistaken in insinuating that threats to Israel have receded. Show me a kindergarten, bus line, cafe or mall that - embracing The Economist's sense of serenity - has removed its armed guards.
The Economist says that "the threat [to Israel] of genocide... has receded." Really. Does the name Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ring a bell? And the last time I checked, the best offer we were getting from Hamas was a 10-year truce, conditioned on a pullback to the 1949 armistice lines, and on opening our doors to millions of "refugees" (and their descendents) "returning" to our truncated state.
What about Fatah's more moderate Mahmoud Abbas? From where I sit, he and Hamas's Ismail Haniyeh seem to disagree more over means than ends (see, for instance, Abbas's January 11 speech in Ramallah).
YET WHILE its editorial is way off the mark, the inside feature, "Second thoughts about the Holy Land" provides an informative, albeit tendentious, summary of Israel-Diaspora relations.
The paper, not known for its Zionist sympathies, seems to revel in highlighting the chasms between the Diaspora and Israel. Nevertheless, it has pulled together all the right data, such as a study (several years old) showing that "only 57%" of American Jews say Israel is "very important" to their Jewish identity. It correctly points to the senseless cleavages created by our narrow-minded Orthodox establishment in their condescending attitude toward the world's pluralistic Jewish majority; it correctly notes that being Jewish is, for many young people in the West, only one part of their multifaceted identities; and it draws attention to the welcome revival - quite unconnected to the Zionist enterprise - of Jewish life in such places as Moscow, Berlin and LA.
It belatedly discovers that young people are finding new, non-Zionist ways of "doing Jewish" such as the fine tikkun olam work of The American Jewish World Service.
To its credit, while The Economist may delight in Israel's discomfiture, it reasonably acknowledges that a "fruitful fusion" between Zion and the Diaspora is the best hope for both.
BACK WHEN I was in college, I was assigned a book of essays edited in 1971 by James A. Sleeper and Alan L. Mintz and entitled The New Jews. So I was intrigued to see The Economist cite a recent work with a similar title in arguing its thesis. New Jews: The End of the Jewish Diaspora by Caryn Aviv and David Shneer rejects the very idea of a "diaspora" with Israel at the core. At first blush this sounds radical - even anti-Zionist. After all, what are we Jews absent the covenant idea of a shared past, a blueprint for the future, and Israel at the center?
That may be my ideal, but in practice modern Jews have been "redefining" what it means to be Jewish since the Enlightenment in the 1700s. If anything, the destruction of European Jewry between 1933 and 1945, the subsequent birth of Israel, and the growth of a heterogeneous, acculturated Diaspora in the West has only served to accelerate the debate over "Who is a Jew" and "what it means to be Jewish" into the 21st century.
In an exchange of e-mails, Caryn Aviv, a lecturer at the Center for Judaic Studies at the University of Denver, and David Shneer, director of the center, write that Israel radically changed the way Jews identify, both as individuals and as a collective. "The legacy of Zionism cannot be ignored in Jewish life today. But neither is Israel necessarily the center of all things Jewish today for all Jews." Israel, they say, is but one of a number of cultural centers reflecting the diversity of Jewish life.
How relevant is Israel to your own lives?
Israel is deeply relevant - as are other Jewish centers around the world. We both spend time each year in Israel. Aviv has lived in Jerusalem. And we each subscribe to the JTA Daily News Bulletin - though we wish it had more news about global Jewish communities and less about the "crisis in the Middle East."
You've suggested that maybe in 10 years' time there could be a sort of "birthright" to take Diaspora youth to Vilnius to study Yiddish, or Prague to study art...
Why not? These places might be just as effective and compelling to engage young Jews, the way birthright Israel has tried to cultivate a connection to Israel.
How do you assess 'The Economist's' contention that Jews around the world are ceasing to regard Israel as a focal point?
Our book argues along a similar line, although we'd say that Israel is becoming one of many centers on a global Jewish map. It is interesting to us that our somewhat radical rethinking of the global Jewish map that discards the concept of diaspora encourages people to think that we're anti-Zionist, which our responses hopefully suggest we're not.
We're also not in the mainstream, which still holds onto the notion that there are Israeli Jews and everyone else is a diaspora Jew, rather than seeing all Jews as global.
What of the dangers Israel faces?
Sure we see the dangers, but our book is about global Jewish life and the multiple ways Jews live it. Focusing on anxiety about existential threats that Israel faces often obscures other important issues within Israel, not to mention important stories about the resilience and vibrancy of Jewish life in lots of other places.
Anyway, your presumption is that championing Israel should come first. But the reality is that it's a balancing act - for some Israel is indeed a high priority, but for a larger group it's not. We don't see that as a problem.
You Israelis need to focus on finding long-term solutions to your problems, and US Jews who are invested in Israel can help. At the same time, we Jews would be smart and strategic to focus on nurturing and sustaining our own communities.
Does the relationship have to be either, or?
Absolutely not. Jews should, can, and do support thriving Jewish communities around the world, including in Israel. We argue that by imagining a global, rather than "diasporic" Jewish world, all Jews benefit. Philanthropy, people, and ideas should be flowing in many different directions.
You've posed the rhetorical question: What does a middle-class professional, secular Jew in LA have in common with a working-class Sephardi Orthodox Jew in Bnei Brak? And your answer is...
That by self-defining as Jews they opt into a common past and heritage (though each would also have her own) which can - but does not always - create an imagined bond between them.
Sure, in terms of practices, beliefs, cultures we find little in common between the two. And we think this condition (which isn't anything new) is okay; that Jews will survive and thrive even if those two imagined Jews have little in common.
PERSONALLY, I'm not sanguine, much less laudatory, about a Jewish world in which Israel is not the cultural, spiritual and political hub, and where two imagined Jews who each think of themselves as Jews have so little in common. But I see all this grappling with identity, alienation, faith and the Israel-Diaspora relationship as part of a continuing process that is "good for the Jews," keeping us from becoming stultified.
Where The Economist sees "Diaspora blues," I see an ancient and stiff-necked people struggling not just with God, but with itself.
I am an Israel briefer and analyst, a political scientist, and a speaker on Jewish civilization. I'm also a rewrite guy & fact-checker, who can make your writing clear and compelling & help you contextualize.
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
Memo to Mrs. Merkel - think trusteeship
The illusion of momentum isn't a good enough reason to reinvigorate the Quartet's involvement.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in her capacity as current head of the European Union, is back in Berlin after a lightning visit to the White House, where she obtained President George W. Bush's agreement to revive Quartet involvement in what is euphemistically known as the Middle East peace process. The Quartet, you will recall, is comprised of the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN.
Bush said it was a "good idea" to convene the Quartet. Merkel added that it would help in achieving a two-state solution if the US and EU "speak with one and the same voice."
Preempting the "why now" question, the chancellor opined: "I simply think that we ought to try time and again to achieve some sort of results in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
Merkel has a lot on her plate. In addition to her national and EU responsibilities she's also currently chair of the G-8. But the Middle East is high on her agenda. In February she's scheduled to visit Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
WITH PALESTINIAN factions killing each other in the streets of Gaza and the West Bank, the steadfastly rejectionist Hamas controlling the government and President Mahmoud Abbas as politically impotent as ever, Merkel's desire to go down the Quartet's road map path again strikes me as worse than futile.
To get a better handle on what's driving the chancellor to breathe new life into this plan, I asked Emory University political scientist Christian Tuschhoff in Berlin.
Tuschhoff answered that Merkel's government (her Christian Democrats had to enter into a coalition with the rival Social Democratic Party) is unpopular and desperate for a success - and it's unlikely to come on the domestic front. So Merkel, wisely, is turning to foreign policy, exploiting Germany's leadership of both the EU and G-8.
Tuschhoff accepts that her foreign policy agenda won't produce more than "a high profile on television," given the intractability of the problems she's confronting. This is true, incidentally, not only on the Arab-Israel front but also on energy issues, security and the moribund EU constitution.
Which is why, he said, no one really expects results from the revived Quartet.
So why bother? "Germans think it is better to have the process going than no effort at all. If the Quartet can reengage Israel and the Palestinians, they believe this will divert their activities from armed conflict."
GERMANS SEE themselves as uniquely qualified to help reconcile Israelis and Palestinians. Berlin has the respect of both sides and is thought of as having the most balanced stance within the EU. Political culture also plays a role: Tuschhoff argues that "reconciliation is a key trait of German foreign policy generally."
As a further domestic explanation of Germany's efforts to revive the Quartet, another source in Berlin suggested that policy on the Arab-Israel conflict was partially driven by the close cooperation between Social Democrat Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and a government-funded foreign policy think tank called Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).
The director of SWP, Volker Pertes, seems able to influence government decision-making.
Some of Steinmeier's initiatives - reaching out to Syria, for instance - are traceable to Pertes's influence, my source said.
BEYOND DOMESTIC drives, the international arena also offers clues to Merkel's Quartet-revival initiative. From the EU's point of view, the Arab-Israel conflict is key to regional stability, political scientist Tuschhoff explained.
To create a sense of policy consistency and follow-through, Merkel is coordinating her approach with Portugal and Slovenia, respectively scheduled to follow Germany's six-month EU presidency.
Moreover, if Merkel can demonstrate that she has genuine influence with the Bush White House, Berlin's weight within the EU can only increase.
EU members are supposed to pursue their foreign policy goals exclusively within the EU framework, Tuschhoff explained. And the Quartet is the best channel through which the EU can exert a role in our region.
It's not clear whether Germany embraces the latest French call for an international peace conference. But Berlin and Paris closely coordinate their foreign policy initiatives. "It would surprise me if France issued a proposal without prior consultation with Germany and possibly German approval," Tuschhoff said.
As we concluded our exchange, Tuschhoff ventured a speculation: "The key [to solving the conflict] is to educate the Palestinian side to act with much greater responsibility and move them away from jihad and terrorism.
"If some international recognition or venue can achieve that 'civilizing' effect on radical Palestinian factions, it should be tried."
THE QUARTET'S contribution to Arab-Israel conflict resolution is the 2002-2003 road map for peace. As the State Department describes it, "The plan is a performance-based, goal-driven plan, with clear phases, timelines, and benchmarks. It involves reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, and humanitarian fields. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict."
The road map's first phase called for ending terrorism and normalizing Palestinian life. The Palestinians were to end all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. Jerusalem was to commit itself to a sovereign Palestinian state living alongside Israel, which prime minister Ariel Sharon did.
Among other things, Israel also committed to freeze all settlement activity and dismantle outposts not authorized by the government. But Israeli officials have long argued that implementation of the road map is contingent on the Palestinians taking concrete steps to dismantle the terror infrastructure.
Since that never happened, neither did much else.
If anything, since the road map evolved the situation on the ground has gotten only more complicated. In January 2006, Hamas - which rejects the very idea of living in peace alongside a sovereign Jewish state - won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. Since then the Palestinian polity has fragmented owing to outside pressure - to shed its rejectionist stance - and internal political cleavages. Today anarchy reigns, with violent clans and splinter groups carrying as much weight as the main terrorist organizations.
It is against this background that Merkel wants to revive the Quartet - as if the Palestinians were capable of agreeing among themselves on a course of action; as if a deal cut with Mahmoud Abbas would hold water with the Islamists; as if the fundamental political culture of Palestinian society, which viscerally rejects accommodation with Israel, could be swept under the rug.
IF MRS. MERKEL wants to do more than engage in the illusion of momentum - and reconvening an international peace conference under the current conditions would be just that - she must have the courage to lead the EU in a radically new direction.
To that end, I direct her attention to Martin S. Indyk's "A Trusteeship for Palestine?" in the May 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs.
We can dispute the details with Indyk (and his scenario anyway needs updating). But the principle that the Palestinian polity desperately needs an invasive "re-socialization" remains key. Merkel should accept that a prerequisite for Palestinian statehood is creating an institutional framework (political, educational and security) that fosters representative government, centrist politics and pluralism.
Can this be done in the Arab context, post-Iraq? What roles should Jordan and Egypt play? What sacrifices would Israel have to make to create the right atmosphere?
These are worthwhile questions that Merkel will need to grapple with assuming she can get first the EU and then the Quartet to make the major philosophical leap of abandoning the road-map illusion that the Palestinians are ready for statehood and investing, instead, in an approach that aims to prepare them to join the family of nations - trusteeship.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in her capacity as current head of the European Union, is back in Berlin after a lightning visit to the White House, where she obtained President George W. Bush's agreement to revive Quartet involvement in what is euphemistically known as the Middle East peace process. The Quartet, you will recall, is comprised of the US, the EU, Russia, and the UN.
Bush said it was a "good idea" to convene the Quartet. Merkel added that it would help in achieving a two-state solution if the US and EU "speak with one and the same voice."
Preempting the "why now" question, the chancellor opined: "I simply think that we ought to try time and again to achieve some sort of results in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
Merkel has a lot on her plate. In addition to her national and EU responsibilities she's also currently chair of the G-8. But the Middle East is high on her agenda. In February she's scheduled to visit Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
WITH PALESTINIAN factions killing each other in the streets of Gaza and the West Bank, the steadfastly rejectionist Hamas controlling the government and President Mahmoud Abbas as politically impotent as ever, Merkel's desire to go down the Quartet's road map path again strikes me as worse than futile.
To get a better handle on what's driving the chancellor to breathe new life into this plan, I asked Emory University political scientist Christian Tuschhoff in Berlin.
Tuschhoff answered that Merkel's government (her Christian Democrats had to enter into a coalition with the rival Social Democratic Party) is unpopular and desperate for a success - and it's unlikely to come on the domestic front. So Merkel, wisely, is turning to foreign policy, exploiting Germany's leadership of both the EU and G-8.
Tuschhoff accepts that her foreign policy agenda won't produce more than "a high profile on television," given the intractability of the problems she's confronting. This is true, incidentally, not only on the Arab-Israel front but also on energy issues, security and the moribund EU constitution.
Which is why, he said, no one really expects results from the revived Quartet.
So why bother? "Germans think it is better to have the process going than no effort at all. If the Quartet can reengage Israel and the Palestinians, they believe this will divert their activities from armed conflict."
GERMANS SEE themselves as uniquely qualified to help reconcile Israelis and Palestinians. Berlin has the respect of both sides and is thought of as having the most balanced stance within the EU. Political culture also plays a role: Tuschhoff argues that "reconciliation is a key trait of German foreign policy generally."
As a further domestic explanation of Germany's efforts to revive the Quartet, another source in Berlin suggested that policy on the Arab-Israel conflict was partially driven by the close cooperation between Social Democrat Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and a government-funded foreign policy think tank called Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).
The director of SWP, Volker Pertes, seems able to influence government decision-making.
Some of Steinmeier's initiatives - reaching out to Syria, for instance - are traceable to Pertes's influence, my source said.
BEYOND DOMESTIC drives, the international arena also offers clues to Merkel's Quartet-revival initiative. From the EU's point of view, the Arab-Israel conflict is key to regional stability, political scientist Tuschhoff explained.
To create a sense of policy consistency and follow-through, Merkel is coordinating her approach with Portugal and Slovenia, respectively scheduled to follow Germany's six-month EU presidency.
Moreover, if Merkel can demonstrate that she has genuine influence with the Bush White House, Berlin's weight within the EU can only increase.
EU members are supposed to pursue their foreign policy goals exclusively within the EU framework, Tuschhoff explained. And the Quartet is the best channel through which the EU can exert a role in our region.
It's not clear whether Germany embraces the latest French call for an international peace conference. But Berlin and Paris closely coordinate their foreign policy initiatives. "It would surprise me if France issued a proposal without prior consultation with Germany and possibly German approval," Tuschhoff said.
As we concluded our exchange, Tuschhoff ventured a speculation: "The key [to solving the conflict] is to educate the Palestinian side to act with much greater responsibility and move them away from jihad and terrorism.
"If some international recognition or venue can achieve that 'civilizing' effect on radical Palestinian factions, it should be tried."
THE QUARTET'S contribution to Arab-Israel conflict resolution is the 2002-2003 road map for peace. As the State Department describes it, "The plan is a performance-based, goal-driven plan, with clear phases, timelines, and benchmarks. It involves reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, and humanitarian fields. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict."
The road map's first phase called for ending terrorism and normalizing Palestinian life. The Palestinians were to end all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. Jerusalem was to commit itself to a sovereign Palestinian state living alongside Israel, which prime minister Ariel Sharon did.
Among other things, Israel also committed to freeze all settlement activity and dismantle outposts not authorized by the government. But Israeli officials have long argued that implementation of the road map is contingent on the Palestinians taking concrete steps to dismantle the terror infrastructure.
Since that never happened, neither did much else.
If anything, since the road map evolved the situation on the ground has gotten only more complicated. In January 2006, Hamas - which rejects the very idea of living in peace alongside a sovereign Jewish state - won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. Since then the Palestinian polity has fragmented owing to outside pressure - to shed its rejectionist stance - and internal political cleavages. Today anarchy reigns, with violent clans and splinter groups carrying as much weight as the main terrorist organizations.
It is against this background that Merkel wants to revive the Quartet - as if the Palestinians were capable of agreeing among themselves on a course of action; as if a deal cut with Mahmoud Abbas would hold water with the Islamists; as if the fundamental political culture of Palestinian society, which viscerally rejects accommodation with Israel, could be swept under the rug.
IF MRS. MERKEL wants to do more than engage in the illusion of momentum - and reconvening an international peace conference under the current conditions would be just that - she must have the courage to lead the EU in a radically new direction.
To that end, I direct her attention to Martin S. Indyk's "A Trusteeship for Palestine?" in the May 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs.
We can dispute the details with Indyk (and his scenario anyway needs updating). But the principle that the Palestinian polity desperately needs an invasive "re-socialization" remains key. Merkel should accept that a prerequisite for Palestinian statehood is creating an institutional framework (political, educational and security) that fosters representative government, centrist politics and pluralism.
Can this be done in the Arab context, post-Iraq? What roles should Jordan and Egypt play? What sacrifices would Israel have to make to create the right atmosphere?
These are worthwhile questions that Merkel will need to grapple with assuming she can get first the EU and then the Quartet to make the major philosophical leap of abandoning the road-map illusion that the Palestinians are ready for statehood and investing, instead, in an approach that aims to prepare them to join the family of nations - trusteeship.
I am an Israel briefer and analyst, a political scientist, and a speaker on Jewish civilization. I'm also a rewrite guy & fact-checker, who can make your writing clear and compelling & help you contextualize.
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